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Reliability is a serious concern for future extreme-scale high-performance computing (HPC) sys-
tems. Projections based on the current generation of HPC systems and technology roadmaps suggest
the prevalence of very high fault rates in future systems. While the HPC community has developed
various resilience solutions, application-level techniques as well as system-based solutions, the solu-
tion space remains fragmented. There are no formal methods and metrics to integrate the various
HPC resilience techniques into composite solutions, nor are there methods to holistically evaluate the
adequacy and efficacy of such solutions in terms of their protection coverage, and their performance
& power efficiency characteristics. Additionally, few of the current approaches are portable to newer
architectures and software environments that will be deployed on future systems. In this paper, we
develop a structured approach to the design, evaluation and optimization of HPC resilience using the
concept of design patterns. A design pattern is a general repeatable solution to a commonly occur-
ring problem. We identify the problems caused by various types of faults, errors and failures in HPC
systems and the techniques used to deal with these events. Each well-known solution that addresses a
specific HPC resilience challenge is described in the form of a pattern. We develop a complete catalog
of such resilience design patterns, which may be used by system architects, system software and tools
developers, application programmers, as well as users and operators as essential building blocks when
designing and deploying resilience solutions. We also develop a design framework that enhances a de-
signer’s understanding the opportunities for integrating multiple patterns across layers of the system
stack and the important constraints during implementation of the individual patterns. It is also useful
for defining mechanisms and interfaces to coordinate flexible fault management across hardware and
software components. The resilience patterns and the design framework also enable exploration and
evaluation of design alternatives and support optimization of the cost-benefit trade-offs among per-
formance, protection coverage, and power consumption of resilience solutions. The overall goal of this
work is to establish a systematic methodology for the design and evaluation of resilience technologies
in extreme-scale HPC systems that keep scientific applications running to a correct solution in a timely
and cost-efficient manner despite frequent faults, errors, and failures of various types.
Keywords: high-performance computing, resilience, fault tolerance, design patterns.
1. Introduction
Extreme-scale, high-performance computing (HPC) will significantly advance discovery in fun-
damental scientific research by enabling multiscale simulations that range from the very small,
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on quantum and atomic scales, to the very large, on planetary and cosmological scales. Comput-
ing at scales in the hundreds of petaflops, exaflops and beyond will also provide the computing
power for rapid design and prototyping and big data analysis. Yet, to build and effectively oper-
ate extreme-scale HPC systems, there are several key challenges, including management of power,
massive concurrency, and resilience [22].
In the pursuit of greater computational capabilities, the architectures of future HPC systems
are expected to change radically. These innovative systems require equally novel components, which
are designed to communicate and compute at unprecedented rates. Traditional HPC system design
methodologies have not had to account for power constraints, or parallelism on the level design-
ers must contemplate for future extreme-scale systems [55]. The evolution in the architectures will
require changes to the programming models and the software environment to ensure application
scalability. In the midst of these rapid changes, the resilience to faults or defects in system compo-
nents, which can cause errors and failures, will be critical. The reliability of these systems will be
threatened by a decrease in individual transistor reliability due to manufacturing defects prevalent
at deeply scaled technology nodes, device aging related effects, etc. [9]. The chips built using these
devices will be increasingly susceptible to errors due to the reduced noise margins arising from
near-threshold voltage (NTV) operation [24] (that will be necessary to meet the limits on power
consumption). These effects are expected to increase the rate of transient and hard errors in the
system. The scientific applications running on these systems will no longer be able to assume correct
behavior of the underlying machine. The errors will propagate and generate various kinds of failures,
which may result in outcomes in HPC applications ranging from data corruptions to catastrophic
crashes.
Managing the resilience of future extreme-scale systems is a complex, multidimensional chal-
lenge. As HPC systems approach exaflops scale, the sheer frequency of faults and errors in these
systems will render many of the existing resilience solutions ineffective. Newer modes of failures due
to faults and errors, which will only emerge in advanced process technologies and complex system
architectures, will require novel resilience solutions. To remain viable the adaptations of existing
solutions, as well as the designs of new solutions, must also navigate the complexity of the hardware
and software environments of future systems. Additionally, HPC resilience solutions, both hard-
ware and software, must optimize for some combination of performance, power consumption and
cost while providing effective protection against faults, errors and failures. Therefore, addressing
the resilience challenge for extreme-scale HPC systems will require integration and coordination be-
tween various hardware and software technologies that are collectively capable of handling a broad
set of fault models at accelerated fault rates.
The HPC community and vendors have developed a number of hardware and software resilience
solutions over the years to confront faults and their consequences in a HPC system and to limit
their impact on the applications. Most of these solutions are based on a limited set of underlying
detection, containment and mitigation techniques that have persisted through generations of sys-
tems and will remain important in the future. The key to the design and implementation of HPC
resilience solutions is no longer the invention of novel methodologies for dealing with the various
fault types that may occur, or to manage the extreme fault rates; rather, it is based on the selection
and combination of the most appropriate solutions among the well-understood resilience techniques
and adapting them to the design concerns and constraints of the emerging extreme-scale systems.
However, there are no systematized methods to adapt the existing solutions to future architectures
and software environments, nor are there formalized to integrate multiple solutions into composite
solutions. There is also a lack of standardized methods to investigate and evaluate the effectiveness
and efficiency of such solutions. Therefore, the designers of HPC hardware and software compo-
nents have a compelling need for a systematic methodology for designing, assessing and optimizing
resilience solutions.
In this work, we develop a structured approach for constructing resilience solutions for HPC
systems and their applications based on the concept of design patterns. Design patterns are descrip-
tions of well-known solutions to specific, repeatedly occurring problems that are encountered in a
specific domain. In an effort to develop resilience design patterns we identify well-known techniques
to handle faults and their consequences in various hardware and software components throughout
the HPC system stack. In general, resilience solutions provide techniques for the detection of faults,
errors or failures in a system, mechanisms to ensure that their propagation is limited, and for mask-
ing of error or failure and recovery of the system. This paper presents a complete catalog of patterns
that capture the solutions for each of these three aspects. Each pattern provides a solution to a
recurring HPC resilience problem under a set of clearly defined assumptions about the type of the
fault, error or failure it deals with and the constraints about the system behavior it guarantees.
The resilience design patterns are specified at a high level of abstraction and describe solutions that
are free of implementation details. The patterns have the potential to shape the design of HPC
applications’ algorithms, numerical libraries, system software, and hardware architectures, as well
as the interfaces between layers of system abstraction. Therefore, they are intended to be useful for
HPC application, library and tool developers, hardware architects and system software designers,
as well as system users and operators.
We codify the resilience design patterns in a layered hierarchy, which classifies the patterns in
the catalog, and clearly conveys the relationships among them. The hierarchical scheme enables
individual hardware/software component designers to focus on problems and constraints related
to detection, containment and mitigation/recovery of specific fault types in specific contexts, while
system architects contemplate role of the individual patterns within the context of the overall system
architecture and software environment and issues related to stitching the various patterns together
and refinement of their interactions. Combining these patterns according to the guidelines given by
the classification scheme provides a systematic way to design and implement new resilience solutions,
port existing solutions to future architectures and software environments, and to holistically evaluate
the scope and efficiency of the solutions. Therefore, using the design patterns as building blocks
enables:
• Systematic design and refinement of resilience solutions by using patterns to outline the overall
structure of the solution (independent of a specific implementation approach), and incremen-
tally converging towards a detailed implementation.
• Design of solutions with a clear understanding of their protection coverage and performance
efficiency.
• Evaluation and comparison of alternative resilience solutions through qualitative and quanti-
tative evaluation of the coverage and handling efficiency of each solution.
• Design of flexible solutions through integration of multiple patterns into complete resilience
solutions. The individual patterns may be independently evolved and developed for portability
to different HPC system architectures and software environments.
• Design of cross-layered resilience solutions that combine capabilities from different layers of
the system stack.
• Optimization of the trade-off space, at design time or at runtime, between the key system
design factors: performance, resilience, and power consumption.
In this paper, we also develop a systematic methodology to combine an essential set of patterns
into productive and efficient resilience solutions. We present a conceptual framework based on the
notion of design spaces that enables HPC designers to use the patterns as reusable design elements.
The framework enables designers to navigate the complexities of composing patterns into complete
solutions within the constraints of performance and power overheads, the fault model and its impact
on the system, hardware and software implementation challenges, etc. The overall goal of this work
is to enable a systematic methodology for the design and evaluation of resilience technologies in
HPC systems that keep applications running to a correct solution in a timely and cost-efficient
manner despite frequent faults, errors, and failures of various types.
2. Design Patterns for HPC Resilience
The occurrences of various types of faults, errors and failures are not rare events in modern
large-scale HPC system environments. The term fault refers to an underlying flaw or defect in a
system that has potential to cause problems, an error refers to the result of the activation of a
fault, which causes an illegal system state. A failure occurs if an error reaches the service interface
of a system, resulting in system behavior that is inconsistent with the system’s specification. The
faults are due to radiation-induced effects such as particle strikes from cosmic radiation and the
system environment, chip manufacturing defects and design bugs that remain undetected during
post-silicon validation and manifest themselves during system operation, as well as circuit wear out,
or aging failure mechanisms of CMOS integrated circuits. The faults may also occur due to software
bugs, which is a growing concern as the complexity of the software environment grows. Due to
the complex system interactions and dependencies between the hardware and software components,
the application program, and the HPC system’s physical environment, preventing the activation of
these faults and containing the propagation of the resulting errors and failures to other components
a significant challenge.
HPC resilience solutions seek effective and efficient management of the different types of fault
and errors to ensure that the applications produce reliable outcomes despite the resulting degrada-
tions and failures. The focus of resilience solutions is on application correctness lieu of, or even at
the expense of, reliability of state of the system. In general, every HPC resilience solution consists
of the following core capabilities:
• Detection: Identifying the presence of an anomaly in the data or control value is an important
aspect of any resilience management strategy. The detection and diagnosis of faults in a system
may allow the remedy of the underlying defect, which may prevent the activation of an error
or failure. The timely detection of errors or failures enables recovery of the system.
• Containment: When an error or failure is discovered in a system, containment strategies
assist in limiting the impact of the event on other components in the system. Limiting the
propagation enables simplified recovery strategies.
• Recovery: The recovery aspect of any resilience solution is necessary to ensure that the
application outcome is correct in spite of the presence of an error or a failure in a system. The
recovery may entail a workaround to isolate and bypass the presence of an error or a failed
component, complete elimination of the error or failure, and may also seek to prevent the root
cause of the underlying fault from resurfacing.
Often the solutions used to achieve these capabilities are based on well-known techniques, which
have been repeatedly used by hardware and software designers to increase system reliability since the
early days of computing systems. These techniques are based on the use of redundant structures to
mask failed components, error-control codes and duplication or triplication with voting to detect or
correct information errors, diagnostic techniques to locate failed components, automatic switchovers
to replace failed subsystems, and the specification of well-defined modular structures and interfaces
for containment and definition of recovery scope [5]. Many of the resilience solutions, hardware and
software, used in HPC environments over the past three decades are also largely based on these set
of techniques.
Our goal is to capture the best-known techniques that are used in the design of HPC resilience
solutions formatted as design patterns. A design pattern describes a generalizable solution to a re-
curring problem that occurs within a well-defined context. It identifies the key aspects of a solution
and presents it in the form of an abstract description, which provides designers with guidelines on
how to solve a problem. Each pattern in this paper presents a solution to a specific problem in
detecting, recovering from, or masking a fault, error or failure event. The pattern descriptions don’t
describe a concrete design or an implementation, and are also free from constraints of details associ-
ated with the level of system abstraction at which the solution can be implemented. Therefore, the
resilience patterns may be used as design templates that may be adapted by the HPC hardware or
software designers for a specific problem at hand. The design of new resilience solutions and adapt-
ing existing ones for future extreme-scale systems is accomplished by combining various patterns
into complete solutions and by refining their interactions. The patterns describe the design decisions
and trade-offs that must be considered when applying a certain solution, which enables designers
to reason about the impact of applying a solution on a system’s performance scalability and power
consumption overhead as well as consider implementation issues. Since the various resilience tech-
niques handle different types of events, and they each provide different guarantees about properties
such as the time or the space overhead introduced to the normal execution of the system, number
of simultaneous errors or failures it can handle, the efficiency of the reaction to a failure, the design
complexity added to the system, the patterns may also be used to explore alternatives solutions to
a given problem.
Based on the insight that any resilience solution is only necessary in the presence of, or some-
times in the anticipation of an anomalous event, such as a fault, error, or failure, we define the
template of a resilience design pattern in an event-driven paradigm. The design pattern template
consists of a behavior and a set of activation and response interfaces. The pattern behavior provides
a description of the solution, which systematically names, explains the semantics of, and evaluates
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Figure 1. Classification of resilience design patterns
the trade-offs involved in using the solution in an HPC environment. The activation and response
interfaces specify the conditions for application of the solution. The individual implementations
of the same pattern may have different levels of performance, resilience, and power consumption.
However, using this universal template enables a standardized approach for the evaluation of pat-
terns and comparison between alternative solutions for a given problem. While any resilience design
pattern must conform to this basic template, the instantiation of a pattern may cover combinations
of detection, containment and mitigation capabilities.
3. Classification of Resilience Design Patterns
For designers of HPC resilience solutions, the patterns serve as reusable design elements. For
the design of resilient hardware and software components, the patterns can be combined in different
ways to produce complete solutions. For a systematic approach to transforming individual patterns
into a solution consisting of a system of patterns, a classification scheme is essential. A classification
outlines the relationships between the various patterns, which enables designers to understand their
individual capabilities and the relationships among the patterns when seeking to integrate different
patterns into composite solutions.
The resilience design patterns may be classified on the basis of the type of event handled,
whether the pattern offers detection, containment, recovery or masking semantics, the scope of
protection coverage offered, design complexity of the patterns, time and space overheads, power
consumption overheads, etc. However, in developing a classification for the resilience design patterns,
our goal is to provide designers with the guidelines to identify the patterns that make up a resilience
solution, specify the roles played by individual patterns, and how they interact, such that the
incorporation of resilience capabilities becomes an essential part of the design process of HPC
hardware and software components.
We develop a pattern classification scheme that organizes the resilience patterns in a layered
hierarchy, in which each level addresses a specific aspect of the problem. Resilience in the context
of HPC systems and its applications has two key dimensions: (1) forward progress of the system
and (2) data consistency in the system. Based on these factors, we organize the resilience design
patterns into two major categories, state patterns and behavioral patterns. These are placed side
by side in Figure 1 to enable designers to separately reason about the patterns that define the scope
of the protection domain and those that define the semantics of the detection, containment and
mitigation. The behavioral patterns are organized in a hierarchy, as shown in Figure 1, in which
the patterns in bottom layer may be used to think about the strategies suitable for confronting
anomalous events depending on whether it is a fault, an error, or a failure. The patterns in the
middle layer explicitly defines the architecture of a solution based on the nature of the event and
considers compatibility of the pattern solution with the overall system design. The top-level patterns
consider issues related to implementation of the solution, including the appropriate granularity and
level of system abstraction, and the overheads incurred by the solution.
For the design and analysis of new solutions, or adapting existing solutions to emerging HPC
environments, hardware and software designers can approach the hierarchy of patterns in a top down
or bottom-up manner. The refinement and optimization of patterns will often require traversing the
layers several times before a solution is finalized. The hierarchical organization of the patterns
permits the different stakeholders to reason about resilience solutions based on their view of the
system and their core expertise. Architects describe the overall organization of the solutions, analyze
the integration of various resilience patterns across the system stack, and evaluate the protection
coverage and overheads to overall system performance. The designers of individual hardware and
software components operate within a single layer of system abstraction and focus on alternative
patterns to address the problem at hand and the analyze the design complexity of instantiating a
specific pattern.
3.1. State Patterns
The state patterns specify the protection domain of a resilience solution. The correctness and
consistency of the system state ensures the correct operation of a system. Therefore, the precise
definition of the scope of the protected system state is an important part of designing a resilience
solution. From the perspective of an HPC application, the notion of state may be classified into
three categories:
• Static State, which represents the data that is computed once in the initialization phase of
the application and is unchanged thereafter.
• Dynamic State, which includes all the system state whose value may change during the com-
putation.
• Operating Environment State, which includes the data needed to perform the computation,
i.e., the program code, environment variables, libraries, etc.
The state patterns, which capture each of these aspects of the system state, are classified as
stateful patterns. The properties of each state pattern may be used to guide the selection of a be-
havioral pattern. Certain resilience strategies may be applied without regard for state and apply
behavioral patterns that are concerned with only the forward progress of the system (for e.g., idem-
potent operations). Therefore, the classification of state patterns also includes a stateless pattern
that enable designers to create solutions that define behavior without state. This organization of
the state patterns enables the behavioral patterns to be applied to individual aspects of a system’s
state. However, in designing a resilience solution, more than one type of state pattern may be fused
to enable the use of a single behavioral pattern for more than one state pattern.
3.2. Behavioral Patterns
The behavioral patterns are concerned with forward progress of the system despite the pres-
ence of anomalous events in the system. These design patterns identify detection, containment, or
mitigation actions that enable the components in a system that realize these patterns to cope with
the presence of a fault, error, or failure event. The behavioral patterns are presented in a layered
hierarchy to highlight the design choices when selecting one pattern over another:
• Strategy Patterns: These patterns define high-level polices of a resilience solution. The
strategy patterns are organized by the type of event that they handle - fault, error or failure,
since the techniques to handle these events are fundamentally different. The classification of
the strategy patterns captures the intent behind of each solution makes the design choices
in applying the patterns explicit. These patterns describe the overall structure and the key
components in a solution in a manner independent of the layer of system stack and hard-
ware/software architectural features. Their descriptions are deliberately abstract to enable
hardware and software architects to reason about the overall organization of the solution and
assess the suitability of the pattern to the full system design.
The fault treatment patterns are concerned with diagnosing and preventing an imminent error
or failure. The recovery and compensation patterns must limit and remove an error or failure
state in the system. The recovery pattern aims to substitute an error/failure-free state in place
of the erroneous/failed system state. The compensation pattern seeks to tolerate the presence
of an error or failure by providing redundancy in the system design.
• Architectural Patterns: The architectural patterns convey specific methods necessary for
the construction of a resilience solution. The patterns provide details about the key compo-
nents and connectors that make up the solution and explicitly specify the type of event that
they handle. These patterns are a sub-class of the strategy patterns, and they are also orga-
nized based on the type of event they handle and the intended impact of the action on the
system resilience. Certain architectural patterns may be adapted to confront faults, errors or
failures. Consequently, there exists an overlap between the patterns in the architectural layer
with more than one type of strategy pattern in Figure 1. The classification of these architec-
tural patterns based on the core solution is also suggestive of the design time and runtime
complexity encountered when instantiating a pattern. Yet, architectural pattern descriptions
are independent of the precise fault model and may be implemented at any layer of the system
stack.
• Structural Patterns: These patterns provide concrete descriptions of the solution rather
than high-level strategies. While the strategy and architectural patterns serve to provide
designers with a clear overall framework of a solution and the type of events that it can handle,
the structural patterns express the details such that they can contribute to the development
of complete working solutions. They comprise of specific instructions for implementing the
pattern, including concrete descriptions of the key parts of the solution. Their descriptions
include specific details of the fault model that the pattern handles. Although the structural
patterns provide more detailed solutions, their descriptions are still independent of the layer
of system abstraction at which the patterns may be instantiated. The pattern descriptions
are flexible enough for most, if not all structural patterns to be suitable for implementation
within hardware structures as well as within algorithms in the application or system software.
The various structural patterns are sub-classes of the strategy and architectural patterns.
Therefore, their first-order organization is also based on the type of fault event that their
solutions handle.
A variety of implementation patterns may be derived from the structural patterns. These
patterns are intended to bridge the gap between the design principles and the concrete details of an
implementation. The pattern descriptions explicitly specify the layer of system abstraction at which
they are implemented, and the activation and response interfaces. The implementation patterns
also enable a standardized way for hardware and software designers to communicate about design
of their resilience solutions. These patterns may be designed as composite patterns, i.e., using a
combination of patterns. Defining implementation patterns enables designers to thoroughly analyze
the overhead of a solution in terms of time and space, as well as the trade-off between design
complexity and runtime complexity. Due to the limitless possibilities in developing implementation
patterns suited for various architectures, software environments and HPC applications through
pattern composition, we only provide detailed descriptions of the foundational state and behavioral
resilience patterns in this paper.
4. The Resilience Design Pattern Catalog
The resilience design pattern catalog contains detailed descriptions of the state and behavioral
patterns. The primary objective of the catalog is to capture the best-known HPC resilience solutions
and present them a standardized and accessible form. For the patterns to be useful to HPC system
architects and individual hardware and software component designers alike, they are written down
in a highly structured format to enable designers to quickly discover whether the pattern solution
is suitable to the problem being solved.
For convenience and clarity, each resilience pattern in the catalog follows the same prescribed
format. The pattern description is formatted in terms of the following key attributes:
• Name : Identifies the pattern and provides a convenient way to refer to it, typically using a
short phrase.
• Problem : A description of the problem indicating the intent behind applying the pattern.
This describes the goals and objectives that will accomplished with the use of this specific
pattern.
• Context : The preconditions under which the pattern is relevant, including a description of
the system before the pattern is applied.
• Forces: A description of the relevant forces and constraints, and how they interact or conflict
with each other, and with the intended goals and objectives. The forces highlight the intricacies
of the problem and make the trade-offs that must be considered explicit.
• Solution : A description of the solution that includes specifics of how to achieve the intended
goals and objectives. This includes the core structure of the solution, its semantics and its
interactions with other patterns. The description includes guidelines for implementing the
solution, as well as descriptions of variations or specializations of the solution.
• Capability : The resilience management capabilities provided by this pattern, which may
include detection, containment, mitigation, or a combination of these capabilities.
• Protection Domain : The resiliency behavior provided by the pattern extends over a certain
scope, which may not always be explicit. The description of the nature of the fault model and
its protection domain enables designers to reason about the scope of the coverage in terms of
the complete system.
• Resulting Context : A brief description of the post-conditions arising from the application
of the pattern. There may be trade-offs between competing optimization parameters that arise
due to the use of this pattern.
• Examples: One or more sample applications of the pattern, which illustrate the use of the
pattern for a specific problem, the context, and set of forces. This also includes a description
of how the pattern is applied, and the resulting context.
• Rationale : An explanation of the pattern as a whole with an elaborate description of how the
pattern actually works for specific situations. This provides insight into its internal workings
of a resilience pattern, including details on how the pattern accomplishes the intended goals.
• Related Patterns: The relationships between this pattern and other relevant patterns. These
patterns may be predecessor or successor patterns in the hierarchical classification, or patterns
that provide similar capabilities.
• Known Uses: Known applications of the pattern in existing HPC systems, including any
practical considerations and limitations that arise due to the use of the pattern at scale in
production HPC environments.
There are three key reasons behind this pattern format: (1) to present the pattern solution
in a manner that simplifies comparison of the capabilities of patterns and their use in developing
complete resilience solutions, (2) to present the solution in a sufficiently abstract manner that
designers may modify the solution depending on the context and other optimization parameters,
and (3) to enable these patterns to be instantiated at different layers in the system.
The complete catalog of resilience design patterns in the template format is available in a
specification document [38]. In the remainder of this section, we summarize each design pattern,
highlighting its key features. The pattern descriptions use the term system to refer to an entity that
has the notion of a well-defined structure and behavior. A subsystem is a set of elements, which
is a system itself, and is a component of a larger system, i.e., a system is composed of multiple
sub-systems or components. For a HPC system architect, the scope of system may include compute
nodes, I/O nodes, network interfaces, disks, etc., while an application developer may refer to a
library interface, a function, or even a single variable as a system. A full system refers to the HPC
system as a whole or to a collection of nodes, which is capable of running a parallel application.
4.1. Strategy Patterns
4.1.1. Fault Treatment Pattern
The emergence of a defect or anomaly in an HPC system environment has the potential to
activate, which may potentially lead to an error or a failure in the system. The Fault Treatment
pattern provides a method that attempts to recognize the presence of an anomaly or a defect within
a system, and creates conditions that prevents the activation of the fault into an error or failed state.
The solution requires an auxiliary monitoring system, which may be a sub-system of the monitored
system or an external system, that observes the key parameters of the monitored system. The
pattern applies to a system that has well-defined parameters that may be used to discover the
presence of anomalies in the behavior of the monitored system. The pattern supports either one, or
both of the following capabilities:
• Fault detection: detect anomalies during operation before they impact the correctness of
the system state.
• Fault mitigation: methods to enable an imminent error or failure to be prevented, or the
defect to be removed.
The protection domain of this pattern extends to the scope of the monitored system and implic-
itly extends to other systems that are interfaced to the monitored system. The benefit of incorporat-
ing fault treatment patterns in a design, or deploying it during system operation is to preemptively
recognize faults in the system; the preventive actions avoid the need for expensive recovery and/or
compensation actions that may be necessary if the fault activation causes an error or failure. In
incorporating this pattern in the design of a HPC hardware or software component, the key consid-
erations are the frequency of interaction between the monitoring and monitored (sub-)systems and
the precision of fault detection. The frequency of these interactions must be minimized to reduce
interference in the operation of the monitored system; yet, the interactions must be frequent enough
to detect every defect in the monitored system. Also, fault must be detected and treated in a timely
manner, i.e., the time interval for the monitoring system to gather data about the monitored sys-
tem and to infer the presence of an anomaly or a defect must be rapid to prevent the activation
of an error/failure. The pattern must also have few false positive and false negatives to minimize
preemptive mitigation actions that are unnecessary.
In HPC systems, various hardware-based solutions for fault detection observe the attributes of
a system, such as thermal state, timing violations in order to determine the presence of a defect in
the behavior of the system that may potentially cause an error or failure. For example, processor
chips such as the IBM Power 8 and Intel Xeon series processors contain thermal sensors that detect
anomalous conditions in the cores. Software-based solutions detect the anomalies in the behavior of
a system’s data variables or control flow attributes to determine the presence of a fault. Heartbeat
monitoring is used for liveness checking of MPI processes, which enables detection of imminent
failure of the MPI communicator [6].
4.1.2. Recovery Pattern
In an HPC environment, the occurrence of errors or failures in the system results in incorrect
answers, and in some cases, catastrophic application crashes. The Recovery pattern enables a system
to survive an error or failure event. The pattern is suitable for a system whose design or runtime
configuration contains no intrinsic support for tolerating the error or failure event. The solution is
based on the periodic creation of snapshots of the system state during error/failure-free operation,
and the maintenance of these snapshots persistently. Upon detection of an error or a failure, the
preserved snapshots are used to recreate a known error/failure-free state of the system. When the
system state is recovered, the operation of the system is resumed. The error or failure in the system
must be detected; the pattern offers no implicit error/failure detection. The pattern applies to a
system that is deterministic, i.e. forward progress of the system is defined in terms of the input state
to the system and the execution steps completed since system initialization. The pattern requires the
system state can be compartmentalized in a form that is accurately representative of the progress
of the system since initialization. It also requires that the system has well-defined intervals that
enables it to transition the system state to a known correct interval in response to an error/failure.
The protection domain for a Recovery pattern is determined by the scope of the state pattern
that is captured during checkpoint creation operation. The size and frequency of creation of check-
points determines the overhead to system operation; frequent checkpointing incurs proportionally
greater overheads during error/failure-free operation, but reduces the amount of lost work when an
error/failure event does occur. Also, the broader the scope of the system state that is preserved,
the larger is the scope of the system state that may be protected from an error/failure event.
The solution offered by this pattern is not dependent on the precise semantics of the error/failure
propagation. Therefore, the effort and complexity in using this pattern in a hardware or software
design, or in the system configuration is low. There are several instances of the usage of the pattern
in HPC systems to support recovery of an application or the complete system upon detection of an
error/failure. For example, various checkpoint and rollback protocols enable HPC applications and
systems to capture state and commit the checkpoint files to parallel file systems [27].
4.1.3. Compensation Pattern
The occurrence of an error or failure event may cause loss in system functionality, or reduction
in system capacity. The HPC applications running on such a system may produce incorrect results
or experience failure. The Compensation pattern makes up for the deficiency or abnormality in a
system that is caused by the error or failure event. The pattern solution introduces redundancy
with into the system design, or in the configuration to counterbalance the (sub-)systems in error
or failed state. The pattern is applicable to a system that is deterministic, and the overall system
design allows for modular design with well-defined inputs and outputs for each module, about which
redundant information is maintained. The redundancy may be in the form of a group of replicas of
a (sub-)system, referred to as n-modular redundancy, or in the form of encoded information about
the (sub-)system state. The pattern supports detection, and in some cases correction, by using the
redundant information about a (sub-) system to recompense for the presence of an error/failure. The
scope of the protection domain, which covers includes the part of the system designed or operated
redundantly, may include a sub-system, or the cover the full system.
The replicas of the modules permit the system to continue operation even in the presence of
a (sub-)system failure. When the redundancy is in the form of modular replication, an error or
failure in one of the (sub-)systems may be tolerated by substituting the (sub-)system with a replica.
In order to recover from 2N errors/failures in the system, there must be 2N + 1 distinct replicas.
For the detection of errors, the outputs of the replicas of the system are compared by an auxiliary
monitor (sub)-system. For a system to tolerate an error/failure, the number of replicas must be
greater than two, in which case the monitor performs majority voting on the outputs produced
by the replicas. This enables incorrect outputs from replicas in erroneous state to be filtered out.
The design effort and complexity of replication of the system depends on the replication method:
deploying identical replicas requires low design effort, but the design of functionally identical but
independently designed versions of a (sub-)system requires much higher design and verification
effort.
The scope and strength of the redundancy employed by the pattern determines the overhead to
the system performance. The pattern introduces a penalty in terms of time (increase in execution
time), or space (increase in resources required) independent of whether an errors or failure occurs
during system operation. The N-modular redundancy approach is used at the hardware and software
levels in a various HPC components; the dual-modular redundancy (DMR) for error detection and
triple-modular redundancy (TMR) for error detection and correction [42] are the most widely used
forms of redundancy. Redundant information in the form of error correction codes is also used
at the hardware-level in the form of ECC [49] and at the application-level for application data
structures [37].
4.2. Architectural Patterns
4.2.1. Fault Diagnosis Pattern
The occurrence of a defect or anomaly has the potential to activate causing an error or failure in
the system. The Fault Diagnosis pattern, which is a derivative of the Fault Treatment strategy
pattern, identifies the presence of the fault and determines its root cause. The solution consists of an
auxiliary monitoring system that observes specific parameters of a monitored system. Until a fault
has not activated into an error it does not affect the correct operation of the system. Therefore, the
Fault Diagnosis pattern makes an assessment about the presence of a defect based on observed
behavior of one or more system parameters. The inference is based on observing deviations in
the standard operating behavior of the monitored system. Identifying the norm of (sub-)system
parameters also enables narrowing the search for the fault type, its location and its root cause. To
incorporate this pattern in an HPC environment requires inclusion of a monitoring (sub-)system,
which introduces additional complexity in the overall system design. When the monitoring system is
extrinsic to the monitored system, the design effort may be simplified, but the interfaces between the
(sub-)systems must be well-defined. The pattern only infers the presence of a defect and reports it via
its response interface, but does not act to remedy the fault. Among the key design challenges when
using the pattern is the resolution limit, which is influenced by the number of parameters observed
and frequency of probing the monitored (sub-)system and affects the precision of the fault detection.
In the context of HPC systems, faults may be detected and diagnosed based by accumulating
empirical data on the characteristics and the behavior of hardware and software components and
use the information to discover faults. For example, HPC components commonly use the Intelligent
Platform Management Interface (IPMI) [21], which provides standardized interfaces for monitoring
hardware health information such as the system temperatures, fans, power supplies, etc. Using
these interfaces, software tools may monitor the health of system resources and infer the presence
of anomalies in the components.
4.2.2. Reconfiguration Pattern
In the event of a fault, error or failure event the configuration, i.e., the organization of the
(sub-)systems in an HPC environment may be affected in ways that result in applications producing
incorrect results, or experiencing fatal crashes. The Reconfiguration pattern, which derives from
the Fault Treatment and Recovery strategy patterns, entails modification of the interconnection
between (sub)-systems. The reconfiguration isolates the (sub-)system affected by the event to
prevent it from affecting the correct operation of the overall system. The pattern assumes that
the system may be partitioned into a set of logical modules and that altering the interconnection
between the modules is possible. The protection domain of the Reconfiguration pattern covers
all (sub-)systems that are interconnected to provide a specified function. The pattern may cause
the system to assume several configurations in response to a fault, error or failure event, each of
which is characterized by its own topology of interconnections, the system must retain functional
equivalency with the original system configuration. The performance overhead of using this pattern
is proportional to the number of (sub-)systems and degree of interconnection between them. The
reconfiguration of the system may also result in system operation at a degraded performance level.
The implementation of the pattern requires partitioning the system into modules that remain
functionally correct in multiple different configurations. There is much complexity associated with
defining the scope of these modules and to validate their functional equivalency in alternative config-
urations. Well-known use cases of the reconfiguration pattern include the NodeKARE module in the
Cray Linux Environment CLE, which automatically runs diagnostics on all involved compute nodes
in the cluster whenever a users program terminates abnormally and removes the failing nodes from
the pool of available compute nodes so that subsequent jobs are allocated only to healthy nodes [18].
4.2.3. Checkpoint Recovery Pattern
Errors or failures in an HPC environment may result in conditions that prevent forward progress
of the system until the error or failure condition is removed. The Checkpoint-Recovery pattern,
which is a specialization of the Recovery strategy pattern, is based on the creation of snapshots of
the system state and maintenance of these checkpoints on a persistent storage system during the
error- or failure-free operation of the system. Upon detection of an error or a failure, the check-
points/logged events are used to recreate last known error- or failure-free state of the system, after
which the system operation is restarted. The solution offered by the pattern supports only recovery;
the detection and containment of the error/failure is beyond the scope of the pattern’s capabilities.
The pattern assumes that the system is capable of compartmentalizing its state in a way that is
accurately representative of the progress of the system since initialization. The techniques used
by the pattern are classified into checkpoint-based and log-based strategies. The checkpoint-based
solution typically captures and preserves the complete state of the system; in contrast, log-based
strategies only record specific system events. Instantiations of the pattern may also use a combina-
tion of checkpointing and event logging. The pattern handles an error or a failure by retrieving a
version of the error or failure-free state from the checkpointed state, and substituting the erroneous
or failed state with the error or failure-free state. Therefore, the system is able to resume operation
with a version of the system state that is free of any effects of the error or failure event.
However, the pattern requires interruption of the system during error or failure-free opera-
tion to record the checkpoint, which incurs an overhead. The frequency of creation of checkpoints
and/or event logging determines the extent of the overhead; frequent checkpointing/logging incurs
proportionally greater overheads during error- or failure-free operation. However, more frequent
checkpointing and logging reduces the amount of lost work when the system encounters an error
or failure event. The checkpointing/logging latency affects the overhead during error- or failure-
free operation on account of the latency to write the checkpoint to a storage system. The scope
of the system state captured during a checkpointing operation results in a proportionate increase
in space overhead due to the storage resources needed to preserve the checkpoints. The solution
offered by this pattern is independent of the type of error or failure and its mode of propagation.
Therefore, the design effort and complexity in instantiating this pattern in any system design in
low. In the context of HPC systems, checkpoint and restart capabilities in the software layers, in-
cluding various library-based and operating system-based solutions such as BLCR [25] for Linux
processes. Certain library implementations of the MPI standard, such as OpenMPI, also support
transparent checkpoint-restart [39]. Log-based recovery based on message logging has been adopted
by implementations of MPI [10].
4.2.4. Redundancy Pattern
When an error or failure event in an HPC environment cannot be prevented from affecting
the correct operation of a component, or the full system, it must be remedied to enable forward
progress of the system. The Redundancy pattern, which is a derivative of the Compensation pattern,
enables offsetting the effects of the error/failure. The pattern solution entails incorporating excess
resources in the (sub-)system design or in the configuration at runtime. The redundancy enables
a (sub-)system to detect, and in certain cases correct an error/failure, by repetition, omission
of a (sub-)system without loss of functionality, or superfluity of (sub-)system state information.
The pattern applies to a (sub-)system that allows for a modular design with well-defined inputs
and outputs for each module. The application of a Redundancy architecture pattern, the following
error/failure handling capabilities can be supported:
• Detection by comparison: observing the likeness of each replica’s outputs as means to
detect the presence of an error or failure in each redundant version of a (sub-)system.
• Fail-over mitigation: substitution of a replica in error or failed state with another identical
replica that is error/failure-free.
• Mitigation by isolation: creation of a group of N replicas of a (sub-)system and majority
voting on the outputs produced by each replica; the outputs that fall outside the majority are
excluded.
• Encoding information for detection and mitigation: maintenance of additional (sub-
)system state information to identify errors within the state.
The protection domain of the pattern extends to the scope of the (sub-)system state about which
redundant information is maintained. The pattern introduces penalty in terms of time (increase in
execution time), or space (increase in resources required) independent of whether an errors or failure
occurs. The use of dual-modular redundancy for error detection and triple-modular redundancy for
error/failure detection and correction are common forms of instantiation of the pattern in various
hardware and software-level modules. HPC systems contain service nodes that are responsible for
system management tasks while the parallel computation is performed by a set of compute nodes.
The tasks include user login, network file system, job and resource management, communication
services. Various existing solutions provide hot-standby redundancy with transparent fail-over to
tolerate failures in the critical services in the service nodes. Well-known examples of redundancy are
the scheduling and resource management services in Simple Linux Utility for Resource Management
(SLURM) [53] , as well as the metadata servers of the Parallel Virtual File System (PVFS) [15]
and the Lustre file system [2]. Production HPC systems such as the Cray XC40 series [19] include
redundant power supplies, voltage regulator modules and cooling fans to ensure continuous operation
in the event that one of these units experience malfunction or failure.
4.2.5. Design Diversity Pattern
Design flaws on account of human error or defective tools manifest themselves as errors,
which may cause failures in HPC environments. The Design Diversity pattern, which is also a
derivative of the Compensation pattern, creates distinct but functionally equivalent versions of
the same design specification, which are created by different individuals or teams, or developed
using different tools. The intent behind applying this pattern is to eliminate the impact of design
bugs during the implementation of a (sub-)system. The pattern enables systems to tolerate
errors/failures due to design faults that may arise on account of incorrect interpretation of the
specifications by designers, mistakes made during implementation, or due to bugs in the tools.
The detection and correction of error/failures is possible due to the independent design processes
reducing the likelihood that the same flaw emerges in the alternative versions of a (sub-)system.
The pattern is based on the assumption that the system has a well-defined specification for which
multiple implementation variants may be created. The versions of the (sub-)system specification
may be applied to a system in a time or space redundant manner. The replica (sub-)systems
are provided with identical inputs, and their respective outputs are compared in order to detect
and potentially correct the impact of an error or a failure in either replica of the systems. The
protection domain of the pattern extends to the scope of the system that is described by the
design specification. However, designing multiple variants of the same (sub-)system specification
requires significantly higher verification and validation effort. The design diversity solution is used
in the validation of the results produced by scientific applications, particularly those that require
high-precision floating point arithmetic. Such applications may be compiled and executed using
alternative implementations of compiler toolchains, message passing libraries, numerical analysis
libraries to verify the application results.
4.3. Structural Patterns
4.3.1. Monitoring Pattern
The various types of errors in HPC environments occur as a result of underlying defects in
hardware or software components. Identifying the defects before they cause an error, which may
result in a failure of one or more components, prevents incorrect behavior of a (sub-)system. The
Monitoring Pattern is a specialization of the Fault Diagnosis architectural pattern, which con-
sists of a monitoring system that observes specific parameters of a monitored system to discover the
presence of anomalies in its behavior. The monitoring system may approach the problem of fault
detection using two strategies:
• Effect-Cause Diagnosis: This approach entails observation of the parameters of the (sub-
)system for anomalies. When a (sub-)system parameter deviates from a range of values con-
sidered normal, the monitoring system attempts to determine the root cause. The monitoring
system logically partitions the system into modules and progressively eliminates the mod-
ules known to be fault-free. Through this process, it narrows the search for the fault in the
(sub-)system.
• Cause-Effect Diagnosis: This approach is based on a set of known fault models and the
monitoring system compares the (sub-)system parameters with a model developed using fault
free system operation, or using simulations. When the observed set of parameters deviates
from a model, the presence of and the type of fault may be inferred.
Based on these inferences, the pattern enables the monitored system to report the presence
of a fault and to analyze its root cause and location. The (sub-)system design or configuration
must include a monitoring (sub-)system. When the monitoring system is extrinsic to the monitored
system, the design effort may be simplified, but the interfaces between the (sub-)systems must be
well-defined. However, when the monitoring system is intrinsic to the design or configuration of the
monitored system, the complexity of the design process increases. The Monitoring pattern only
infers the presence of a defect and reports it, but does not remedy the defect. Various HPC system
installations use the monitoring pattern through tools for collecting performance- or health-related
data about the system. Popular solutions include: Ganglia Monitoring System [44], Nagios [1] and
OVIS Lightweight Distributed Monitoring System [3].
4.3.2. Prediction Pattern
The accurate prediction of where faults are likely to occur in a (sub-)system enables reduc-
tion in the costs of a resilience solution by preemptively enhancing the (sub-)system’s capabilities
to handle any resulting errors or failures. The Prediction Pattern, which is also a derivative of
the Fault Diagnosis architectural pattern, develops models that estimate future faults based on
the observations of the parameters of a (sub-)system, or based historical trend analysis of these
parameters. For prediction, the pattern may use: (i) Rule-based methods that build rules of as-
sociation to capture the causal correlations between system parameter values and fault events, or
(ii)Statistical-based methods that discover probabilistic characteristics of potential errors/failures in
a system using statistical inference techniques to examine correlations between previous events. The
monitoring system of this pattern contains the following components:
• Filter/Preprocessor : removes incomplete fault data and duplicates and produces a consistent
format for analysis.
• Regression: seeks to analyze the parameter values and establish relationships between them.
• Knowledge Base: storage component that maintains the rules or statistical properties and
models, which may be used for online prediction of fault events using real-time data captured
from the monitored system.
Much like the Monitoring Pattern, the Prediction pattern only infers the presence of a defect
and reports it, but does act to remedy the fault. Based on the prediction method and accessibility
of the system parameters selected for observation, the prediction may not be very precise, which
leads to false positive outcomes, or unforeseen events that are missed by the prediction algorithm.
However, when errors or failures are predicted at a high degree of accuracy, avoidance or preventative
actions may be applied. For example, event prediction may be used for proactive management in
large-scale clusters [51].
4.3.3. Restructure Pattern
The occurrence of a fault, error, or failure event sometimes impacts a system in a way that
affects the correctness of the interactions between sub-systems in an HPC environment, which
causes further errors, or a failure of the system. The Restructure Pattern, a derivative of the
Reconfiguration pattern, modifies the configuration between the interconnected sub-systems to
isolate the specific sub-system affected by a fault, error or failure. The reconfiguration pattern alters
the organization of the (sub-)systems to work around the affected (sub-)system, or it excludes the af-
fected (sub-)system from interacting with the remaining (sub-)systems (i.e., the restructured system
includes N-1 sub-systems). In either case, the pattern seeks to maintain (sub-)system functionality
equivalent to that before the occurrence of the fault, error or failure event.
The protection domain of the pattern spans the part of (sub-)system whose constituent sub-
systems may be reconfigured. While the pattern seeks to restructure the sub-systems in an operating
state that is functionally equivalent to the fault-free state, the pattern may result in the operation
of the system in degraded condition, which incurs additional time overhead to the system. Existing
solutions that restructure the system in response to an event include the ULFM extension to the
MPI standard [7], which allows parallel applications to get notifications of process failures. ULFM
provides a set of routines to revoke and restructure a MPI communicator that consists of the
remaining active processes. Dynamic page retirement is another instantiation of the restructure
pattern solution, in which pages that have an history of frequent memory errors are removed from
the pool of available pages.
4.3.4. Rejuvenation Pattern
When a (sub-)system in an HPC environment behaves incorrectly on account of a fault, error or
failure, the correctness of the full system may be compromised. The Rejuvenation Pattern, which
is also a derivative of the Reconfiguration pattern, isolates the specific part of the (sub-)system
affected by a fault, error or failure and restores it to an operating state that is free of any effects
of the event. Only the affected part of the system is rejuvenated to ensure correct operation of the
system by the pattern. The pattern requires the system operation to be halted to identify the part
of the system affected by the event.
The protection domain of the pattern spans the part of system whose state may be rejuvenated.
The rejuvenation is often a slow process that requires substantial additional overhead to identify the
part of the system affected by the fault, error or failure, and to selectively reinitialize the system,
in addition to overhead incurred due to any lost work. The rejuvenated system may not maintain
the level of performance as before the occurrence of an event. Examples of rejuvenation include
the Mini-Ckpts framework, which recovers fatal operating system crashes by rejuvenating only
the kernel data structures, which are preserved in persistent memory, without affecting the HPC
application state [31]. Algorithm-based recovery methods for data corruptions in structures used in
numerical analysis problems use interpolation of neighboring data values to rejuvenate data values
in error state. Such methods have been demonstrated in the context of the HartreeFock algorithm
used in computational chemistry codes [20].
4.3.5. Reinitialization Pattern
The impact of a fault, error or failure may sometimes be irreversible such that the affected
(sub-)system cannot be restored to a form that permits correct operation. The Reinitialization
Pattern, also a derivative of the Reconfiguration pattern, simply restores the system to its initial
state. This causes system operation to restart with a pristine reset of state, which implicitly cleans
up the effects of the fault, error or failure in the system. The pattern is applied in conditions in which
the mitigation or recovery from the fault, error or failure event is deemed impossible, or excessively
expensive in terms of overhead to performance. The pattern expects the fault, error or failure in the
system to be detected; the pattern offers no implicit fault monitoring, prediction, or error/failure
detection capability. The restoral of the system state to the initial state causes lost work, but
guarantees the impact of the event is completely removed before service is resumed. Various cluster
management software systems, such as the Cray Hardware Supervisory System (HSS) [18], enable
malfunctioning nodes in the cluster to be reset. The HSS initiates a reboot sequence for a failing
node without disrupting the remaining nodes in the system.
4.3.6. Rollback Pattern
Following an error or a failure event, the (sub-)systems in a HPC environment often lose all
work performed until the occurrence of the event. The Roll-back Pattern, which derives from the
Checkpoint Recovery architectural pattern, periodically captures the progress of the system and
maintains these as system snapshots on a persistent storage system during the error/failure-free op-
eration of the system. The rollback recovery is performed by restoring the system state based on the
last known stable version of (sub-)system state. The solution provides rollback recovery, i.e., based
on a temporal view of the system’s progress, the system state restored during the error/failure re-
covery process is a previous error/failure-free state of the system. For a system that is deterministic,
the pattern creates checkpoints of the system, which requires the capability to export the current
(sub-)system state and import a new state during recovery. When the system design consists of
several sub-systems, the pattern must coordinate the process of checkpointing. The instantiation of
the pattern may apply the following coordination policies:
• Coordinated rollback recovery protocol : The (sub-)systems coordinate the process of creating
checkpoints, creating globally consistent checkpoint states, which simplify the recovery.
• Uncoordinated roll-back recovery protocol : The (sub-)systems each independently decide when
to create their respective checkpoints. This approach has the potential to cause the full-
system to propagate roll-backs to the initial system state to ensure that all dependencies are
met (called the domino effect).
• Communication-based rollback recovery protocol : The protocol enables each (sub-)system to
create local checkpoints, but periodically also enforces coordinated checkpoints between all
(sub-)systems. Such a hybrid strategy helps avoid the domino effect.
For systems with non-deterministic events, the pattern employs log-based protocols, which use
a combination of checkpointing and logging of non-deterministic events in the (sub-)system. The
log-based rollback recovery is based on piecewise deterministic assumption, in which the system
identifies and records the nondeterministic events and information necessary (encoded in tuples
called determinants) to replay the event during recovery. The pattern may use the following logging
protocols:
• Pessimistic: The protocol assumes that a failure occurs after a nondeterministic event in the
system. Therefore, the determinant of each nondeterministic event is immediately logged to
stable storage.
• Optimistic: The determinants are held in a volatile storage and written stable storage asyn-
chronously. This protocol makes the assumption that the logging is completed before the
occurrence of an error or failure. The error- or failure-free overhead of the optimistic approach
is low.
• Causal : The protocol provides a balanced approach by avoiding immediate writing to stable
storage (much like the optimistic protocol in order to reduce event free overhead), but each
sub-system commits output independently (much like the pessimistic protocol in order to
prevent creation of orphan sub-systems in the context of a multicomponent environment).
The protection domain for a Rollback pattern is determined by the extent of state captured
during checkpoint operation and/or the number of system operations that can be recovered from
the log of events. The time overhead introduced by the use of the pattern during error-free operation
is correlated with the frequency of taking checkpoints. The rollback leads to loss of work due to
the need to recover the system from a previous version of the system state. The amount of lost
work is also correlated with the frequency of the checkpointing/logging. The worst-case scenario for
recovery using this pattern is a roll-back to the initial state of the system. In the context of HPC
systems, checkpoint and restart capabilities in the software layers, including various library-based
and operating system-based solutions, enable recovery from process errors/failures and rollback
of the applications. Well-known solutions that employ the rollback recovery pattern include the
CoCheck checkpoint-restart for MPI [56], as well as BLCR [25] and SCR [48]. Message logging
protocols have been implemented in OpenMPI to support faster failure recovery [10].
4.3.7. Roll-forward Pattern
When an error or failure event occurs in an HPC environment, a (sub-)system incurs loss of
the work performed prior to the occurrence of the event. The Roll-forward pattern is a derivative
of the Checkpoint Recovery pattern that avoids loss of work by using checkpoints to recover the
(sub-)system to a stable state immediately before the error or failure event. Like the Rollback
pattern, the solution entails the creation of snapshots of the system state and maintenance of these
checkpoints on a stable storage system during the error- or failure-free operation of the system; log-
based protocols use a combination of checkpointing and logging of non-deterministic events in the
(sub-)system. However, the pattern uses the previously captured checkpointed state and/or logging
information to recreate a stable version of the (sub-)system state identical to the one right before
the error or failure occurred. This prevents the need for re-execution of all (sub-)system operations
from the last stable checkpoint. The pattern must select checkpointing based on the policies similar
to those used by the Rollback pattern: coordinated, uncoordinated, or communication-based.
The pattern may use the following protocols for roll forward:
• Log-based protocols: Based on the piecewise deterministic assumption, in which the (sub-
)system uses the determinants to recreate state. The logging mechanisms may be based on
pessimistic, optimistic, or causal protocols.
• Online recovery protocols: Do not rely on event logging for roll forward of the (sub-)system;
rather, they use inference methods to recreate state, or may permit the state to self-correct
after restart.
The protection domain of a Roll-forward pattern is determined by the extent of state captured
during checkpoint operation and/or the number of system operations that can be recovered from
the log of events. The pattern solution is not dependent on either the type of event, or the precise
semantics of the error propagation; therefore, the design complexity in using this pattern in any HPC
(sub-)system design in low. For the pattern to be effective in an HPC environment, the overhead to
bring the system state to the most recent state before the error or failure must be less than or equal
to the overhead of rollback recovery. In the context of HPC systems, software solutions typically
implement roll-forward recovery using algorithm-specific knowledge. For example, Global View of
Resilience (GVR) [13] uses versioning of distributed arrays supports, in which roll-forward recovery
is based on application-specified mechanisms for each array structure.
4.3.8. N-modular Redundancy Pattern
An error or failure of a (sub-)system in an HPC environment may cause loss in system capa-
bility or capacity, which prevents correct operation, or failure, of the full system. The N-modular
Redundancy Pattern, which is a derivative of the Redundancy architectural pattern, remedies the
effect of the error or failure by isolating the affected (sub-)system and compensating for its removal
from the system design or configuration with a replica module. The solution entails creation of a
group of N replicas of a (sub-)system. The replicated versions of a (sub-)system enables their use in
various configurations to support errors or failures in one of the replicas, including fail-over, active
comparison for error detection, or majority voting for detection and correction by excluding the
replica whose outputs fall outside the majority. The pattern applies to a system with a modular
design that has a well-defined scope and set of inputs and outputs. The scope of the pattern may
be a sub-system in the HPC hardware or software architecture, or it may even encompass the
complete system scope. Each of the N modules of the system exist simultaneously; the modules
may be active at the same time (spatial replication), or may operate in succedent order (temporal
replication), or the (sub-)system may activate the redundant modules on-demand. The protection
domain of the pattern extends to the scope of the module that is replicated. Implementations of the
MPI standard use these forms of redundancy for MPI messages, or even by replicating MPI process
ranks; the MR-MPI [28], rMPI [29] and RedMPI [30] are well-known MPI implementations using
the n-modular redundancy approach.
4.3.9. Forward Error Correction Code Pattern
When the state information of a (sub)-system is affected by an error, the incorrect state often
leads to malfunctioning of the (sub-)system, which may lead to the failure of the full system. The
Forward Error Correction Code Pattern, which is a derivative of the Redundancy architectural
pattern, maintains redundant information about (sub-)system state. The pattern applies to a system
whose state may be represented using a sequence of symbols. The solution consists of an encoder
and a decoder module. In the simplest form, the encoder repeats each symbol that represents the
(sub-)system state. The decoder module checks both instances of each state symbol. The general
form of this pattern uses an encoder module that accepts k state information symbols and separately
appends a set of r redundant symbols that are derived from the symbols representing (sub-)system
state. The output of the encoder module is a (n, k) code, in which n = k+r. While the encoded
redundant state information is a complex function of the original state, the encoder module does not
modify the state information. The decoder module extracts the original state from the encoded state
symbols. The availability of redundant state information enables recovery of system from corruption
in symbols that represent the (sub-)system state by using the redundant information to reconstruct
the original state information.
The protection domain of the pattern extends to the scope of the (sub-)state that is encoded
and decoded using the forward error correction code. The number of errors that are detectable and
correctable is limited by the amount of redundant information contained in the error correction
code. Since every operation that affects the system state requires encoding/decoding operations,
the pattern introduces penalty in terms of time (increase in state information access latency), and
space (increase in resources required to store state information) independent of whether an errors or
failure occurs. There are various schemes that enable forward error correction in memory devices,
storage systems, as well as in communication channels in HPC systems. Examples of forward error
correction code (FEC) in HPC environments include parity bits, checksums, Hamming codes, hash
function codes; more elaborate schemes such as systematic cyclic block codes include binary BCH,
Reed-Solomon, Cyclic redundancy checks (CRC). The use of ECC in memory DIMMs is another
well-known example of FEC for compensation of bit flip errors within the DRAM memory lines [49].
Algorithm-based methods use FEC schemes such as checksums to detect and correct errors in
application data structures [37].
4.3.10. N-version Design Pattern
When a design bug exists in a (sub-)system design or configuration, the resulting error or failure
is often unavoidable. Therefore, the detection and mitigation of the impact of such errors or failures is
critical. The N-version Design Pattern, which is a derivative of the Design Diversity pattern,
applies distinct implementations of the same design specification created by different individuals
or teams. The pattern applies N (N ¿= 2) independently implemented versions in a time or space
redundant manner. The N versions of the (sub-)system are operated simultaneously, and a majority
voting logic is used to compare the results produced by each design version. Due the low likelihood
that different individuals or teams make identical errors in their respective implementations, the
pattern enables compensating for errors or failures caused by a bug in any one implementation
version.
The pattern applies to a system that has a well-defined specification for which multiple imple-
mentation variants may be designed. The protection domain extends to the scope of the system
that is described by the design specification. The extent to which each of the n versions are different
affects the ability of the pattern to tolerate errors/failures in the system. The use of the n-version
design pattern requires significant effort for design, implementation, testing and validation of the
independent versions of a (sub-)system specification. Differences in the design may cause differences
in timing in generating output values for comparison and majority voting; these differences incur
overhead to the overall (sub-)system operation.
4.3.11. Recovery Block Pattern
The errors and failures caused by design bugs prevent HPC (sub-)systems from operating in
conformance with the (sub-)system specification. Yet, the application of the N-version Design
pattern may be impractical in various contexts. The Recovery Block Pattern, which is also a
derivative of the Design Diversity pattern, introduces an alternative implementation of the same
design specification to perform detection and mitigation of errors. The pattern is a specialization
of the N-version Design pattern since the solution also relies on multiple variants of a design
that are functionally equivalent but designed independently. The recovery block is invoked when
the result from the primary version of the system fails an acceptance test, which often indicates
the presence of an error or failure. The instantiation of this pattern may sometimes include the
function that performs the acceptance test. The consequence of applying the pattern in an HPC
environment results in (sub-)system designs that consist of a module that implements the primary
design and a module that serves as an exceptional case handler, i.e., the recovery block. There is
also an adjudicator that applies an acceptance test to validate the results produced by the primary
system. If the adjudicator does not accept the results of the primary system, it invokes the exception
handler subsystem, which indicates that the primary system could not perform the requested service
operation. The protection domain of the pattern extends to the scope of the primary system, i.e.,
the scope for which the recovery block is created. Examples of the recovery block pattern in HPC
include the Containment Domains (CD) [14] programming construct, which provides a recovery
routine initiated upon detection of an error in the execution of the block of code encapsulated by
the CD. This enables the CD to constrain the detection and correction of errors to the boundary
of the domain.
4.4. State Patterns
4.4.1. Static State Pattern
The Static state pattern encapsulates all aspects of a system’s state that is computed when the
system is initialized, but is not modified during the system operation. The static state outlives the
process that creates and initializes it. From the perspective of an HPC application, the static state
includes program instructions and variable state that is computed upon application initialization.
The correctness of the static state at all times is essential to the correct execution and outcome of
a program. The invariant property of this state enables the use of a resilience behavioral pattern
that can leverage this property to detect and recovery errors/failure of such state. For example,
various algorithm-based fault tolerance methods leverage the property of invariance in the static
state. These methods maintain replicas of the application variables in the static state pattern;
recovery entails setting these variables to their default data values. A well-known application of
this pattern is in the context of algorithm-based resilience techniques used in the design of iterative
linear solvers. For the solution of a system of equations A.x = b, the static data structures such as
the operand matrix A, the right-hand side vector B, or the preconditioner are computed once in
the initialization phase of the application and are unchanged after. Errors in these structures are
recovered using maintaining checksums [37].
4.4.2. Dynamic State Pattern
The Dynamic State pattern encapsulates the state that changes as the system makes forward
progress. In an HPC application, the pattern refers to all aspects of the program state that changes
as an application program executes. The dynamic state includes the data variables that are modified
by the algorithm, as well as the control-flow variables that enable forward progress of the system.
The dynamic feature of this state pattern implies that any faults or errors in such state amounts
to lost work. Separating the dynamic state enables the identification of the appropriate behavioral
resilience patterns to detect and correct errors in such state. Due to the transitory nature of the
variables in the dynamic state patterns, the behavioral patterns often require preservation of the
state pattern, or repetition of operations from a known stable point to recreate a version of the
variables in the state pattern that are free from the effects of any errors. The most well-known
method for protecting dynamic state is using checkpointing-based roll-back recovery methods [27].
4.4.3. Environment State Pattern
The Environment State Pattern encapsulates the system state that plays a supporting role
in the operation of the system. The pattern defines the scope of the system state that provides a
common set of services in support of the primary function of the system. The environment also fa-
cilitates and coordinates the operation of various sub-systems in a system. In general, HPC systems
navigate complexity through the definition of abstractions that hide the details of specific functions
behind well-defined interfaces. When executing an HPC application, the overall system state may be
partitioned into the aspects that are related to the application program state and those that provide
access to the system resources and services that enable the application to fulfill its function. The
pattern enables the resilience behavior of the environment state to be reasoned about separately
from the resilience behavior of the primary system state, i.e., an HPC application. The separation
of the environment state enables designers to instantiate behavioral patterns that are independent
of the design of the algorithms of HPC applications. Any changes in the environment due an error
or failure event directly affects the application program operating within the environment. While
an application program does not normally have complete control over its environment, it may exert
partial control to affect the environment through well-defined interfaces. The Environment state
pattern defines the scope of the state that support resource sharing, coordination and communi-
cation between the various (sub-)systems. In a typical HPC system stack, the environment state
pattern includes productivity tools and libraries, the runtime system, the operating system, file
systems, communication libraries, etc. For example, operating-system based resilience mechanisms
are independent of the resilience features of the application program and solely focus on the cor-
rectness of the data structures within the kernel. Mini-Ckpts is a known example of a framework
that emphasizes the recovery of the OS environment by preserving kernel structures in persistent
memory [31]. Similarly, the ULFM MPI provides recovery of the communication environment from
the failure of processes by reconstructing the MPI communicator by creating consensus among the
remaining set of processes [7].
4.4.4. Stateless Pattern
The Stateless pattern enables the definition of resilience solutions that are independent of
system state. Since every resilience solution consists of at least a state and behavior pattern, the
Stateless pattern provides the construct of null state in order to create solutions that have a well-
defined notion of behavior, but don’t define a scope for the behavior. From the perspective of an HPC
application, the definition of the Stateless pattern permits the definition of the scope of operations
that perform detection or recovery without explicitly specifying the variable state of the program
that is affected by the operations. The solutions that are based on a Stateless pattern may include:
(i) applications that consist of predominantly memory load operations that rarely contain state-
modifying memory and I/O operations; these applications typically perform reduction operations
over large number of data elements, and (ii) applications that yield imperfect results since their
algorithms are based on approximation and iterative refinement, or use noisy input data to begin
with. The stateless pattern is utilized together with behavioral resilience patterns whose actions
do not necessitate modifying any particular aspect of the system state during the detection or
recovery. However, the resilience solution that uses a stateless pattern must select and instantiate a
behavioral pattern that is capable of dealing with any additional side-effects due to the inclusion of
the stateless pattern. The use of the transaction model to provide resilient behavior is an example
of the Stateless pattern. Transactions support execution of a sequence of operations that may
Figure 2. Elements of a resilience solution for HPC systems and applications
complete as a unit, or fail; the notion of partial execution is not supported. For example, in the Relax
framework, the idempotence property guarantees that any region can be freely re-executed, even
after partial execution, and still produce the same result. Relax supports language-level constructs
as well as compiler-based techniques that enable the definition of idempotent regions of execution;
the recovery of such regions are stateless [43].
5. Building Resilience Solutions using Design Patterns
5.1. Components of Resilience Solutions
Each pattern in the resilience design pattern catalog presents a solution to a specific problem
in detecting, containing or mitigating a fault, error or failure event. However, ensuring that an
HPC application executes to result in a correct solution despite the occurrence of the events in
the systems requires that a resilience solution be constructed using multiple such patterns that
are organized in a well-defined system of patterns. The artifacts of a design process that uses
design patterns are complete resilience solutions that confront a specific type of event and provide
detection, containment and mitigation capabilities over a well-defined protection domain. Therefore,
the first step in the design of a solution is the selection of patterns for each of these capabilities.
Therefore, a complete solution consists of at least one state pattern (defining scope of the protection
domain) and one or more behavioral patterns (supporting a combination of detection, containment
and mitigation solutions). These key constituents of a complete solution are shown in Figure 2.
The pattern descriptions allow for instantiating each pattern in the catalog at any layer of the
system stack. The individual patterns that make up a complete solution can be implemented across
layers the system stack. The architecture of a HPC system consists of various types of processor,
memory, storage and networking components, and its software stack is a complex multicomponent
environment consisting of communication and threading libraries, productivity software and tools,
including numerical libraries, runtime systems, profiling tools, etc. To construct resilience solutions
for the hardware and software components requires methodically selecting resilience patterns that
may be conveniently incorporated into the design of these components. The coordination between
the resilience patterns, particularly when implemented across layers of abstraction, requires well-
defined activation and response interfaces for each pattern.
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Figure 3. Design Spaces for construction of resilience solutions using patterns
5.2. Design Spaces
For hardware and software designers to make practical use these patterns in the development
of resilient versions of their designs, a set of guidelines are necessary to combine the patterns and
refine their interactions. The hierarchical classification scheme articulates only certain aspects of
the pattern selection and integration process by categorizing the patterns based on the type of event
they handle and the core technique employed. However, the selection of patterns solely on the basis
of their detection, containment and mitigation capabilities leaves much to skills of the designer in
terms of finalizing the design and the implementation of the component or system. To build practical
resilience solutions various other factors must be considered, including the layer of abstraction for
their implementation, scalability of the solution, portability to other architectures, dependencies on
any hardware/software features, flexibility to adapt the solution to accelerated fault rates, capability
to handle other types of fault and error events, the performance and performance overheads.
To enable a systematic assessment of the suitability of a resilience pattern to a specific context
and to integrate patterns into composite solutions, we develop a design framework. The framework
enables the creation of an initial outline of the resilience solution that identifies the strategy patterns
and the captures the dimensions and capabilities solution resulting from the composition of the
patterns. The framework is based on design spaces that are arranged in a hierarchy. Each design
space progressively refines the relationships between the patterns and optimizes the overall solution,
which allows for a structured approach for constructing customized designs. By navigating over
the design spaces, the framework enables the designer to approach the various issues that must
be addressed in the process of developing practical resilience solutions. The framework, which is
illustrated in Figure 3, consists of the following design spaces:
• Capability: This design space is concerned with identifying the patterns that support capa-
bilities for the detection, containment, mitigation of a specific type of fault, errors or failure
event. Based on the system context, this design space also considers the organization of the
overall structure of the solution.
• Fault model: By identifying the root causes of fault and understanding the impact and
propagation through the system enables deciding the architecture patterns. The design space
emphasizes the selection of architecture patterns and the distribution of responsibility among
the chosen patterns.
• Protection domain: This design space concentrates on the definition of the protection do-
main by deciding the state patterns and their composition. This enables a clear encapsulation
of the system scope over which the resilience patterns operate.
• Interfaces: The identification and implementation of the activation and response interfaces
for behavioral patterns affect the propagation of fault/error/failure event information. Within
this design space, the layer of abstraction appropriate for the instantiation of the pattern, as
well as the performance and power overheads are considered. The design space explores vari-
ous implementation constructs that facilitate the coordination between the various patterns,
particularly across system layers.
• Implementation mechanisms: This design space is concerned with low-level implementa-
tion details of how patterns are embedded within a hardware structure, or in software code. It
considers the constraints imposed by specific features of hardware, execution or programming
models, software environment and how the various pattern implementations coordinate their
behavior in this context.
The design spaces represent the most important aspects of a resilience solution that a designer
must contemplate in order to create effective and efficient resilience solutions. As a designer navigates
through these design spaces, they are able to develop a clearer understanding of the solution profile
and the general constraints, which enables them to select the appropriate patterns from the catalog
and decide on implementation alternatives. The use of resilience patterns in the context of the
framework provided by the design spaces enables HPC system designers, users and application
developers to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of novel resilience techniques, as well as
analyze and evaluate existing solutions. They provide a structured flow to the design process the
design spaces articulate the critical decision points in the design of a resilience solution, providing
guidelines for the selection of the appropriate patterns based on the requirements of protection and
the cost of using specific patterns.
Designers may use various approaches to navigate the design spaces, including a strictly top-
down approach, in which the design is driven by the event type and model that a system must be
protected against, and the implementation of the system is adapted to enable the system to survive
the different ways in which the event may impact the reliability of the system. Alternatively, in a
bottom-up approach, the resilience capability must be woven into the existing hardware or software
component designs and interfaces, and additional components are included to enhance the protection
coverage, or to handle specific fault model behaviors. Often, designers may be required to take a
hybrid approach, in which the design spaces are revisited in an effort to refine a design, to optimize
the features of a solution, and to enable designers to overcome constraints imposed by any hardware
or software system features.
6. Case Studies
This section explores use cases for the application of resilience design patterns to the systematic
design and analysis of resilience solutions. We use the pattern-based approach for understanding
Figure 4. Case Study: Checkpoint & Restart-based Recovery
existing solutions with the view to adapt the solution to future generations of HPC systems as
well as for exploration and assessment of novel cross-layered solutions. The case studies describe
the pattern-based design process for different fault models on a notional architecture and software
environment of a HPC system.
6.1. Checkpoint and Rollback Solution for Process Failures
For this case study, we aim to develop a resilience solution that enables an HPC application to
survive process failures. In an HPC environment, the diagnosis of the precise root cause of these
failures is difficult due to the lack of sufficient hardware-level debugging information. For designing
a purely software-based solution, the fault model is a process crash or hang whose cause is unknown.
This type of failure results from the presence of a fault in the processor or memory that activates,
which causes an error in the form of an illegal instruction, or an invalid address in the program
state. When the program execution encounters the address in the program state that is in error
state, the process may crash or hang.
Checkpoint and restart (C/R) solutions are the often used to support resilience to process fail-
ures in HPC systems. We reexamine this well-known software-based solution using the structured
pattern-based approach to analyze composition of the constituent patterns needed to design this
solution. Such analysis will be useful for adapting C/R solutions to future systems and evaluate their
performance characteristics. The goal of a complete C/R solution is to recover a failed process such
that the application may resume from an error-free state. This requires that the solution capture
the image, or snapshot, of a running process and preserves it for later recovery. For parallel appli-
cations, the C/R framework’s coordination protocols produce a global snapshot of the application
by combining the state of all the processes in the parallel application. Since most parallel appli-
cations using the message passing interface (MPI) define a MPI process to be a POSIX process,
the protection domain of the solution must cover the complete POSIX process state. Therefore,
we fuse the Persistent and Dynamic and Environment state patterns, which extends the domain
of our system-level checkpointing solution to the entire memory associated with a process. In a
Linux-based environment, the protection domain covers the total virtual address space of a Linux
process.
For the detection of a process failure, we require instantiation of the Fault Treatment strategy
pattern. Specifically, our solution requires a Fault Diagnosis architecture pattern to discover the
location of the failure and the type of event, which is enabled by a Monitoring structural pattern.
The instantiation of the Monitoring pattern is a kernel-level heartbeat monitor, which is deployed
in the system to detect whether the process is alive.
For the selection of a recovery pattern, there are key two considerations: (i) the frequency of
node failures; and (ii) the performance and resource overhead of applying the pattern. The space
overhead incurred by instantiating a Compensation strategy pattern for recovery is substantial due
to the need to replicate the protection domain. For systems that experience process failures infre-
quently, the use of a compensation-based solution proves prohibitively expensive. Therefore, for the
failure recovery we select the Recovery strategy pattern. The Checkpoint-Recovery architectural
pattern is appropriate since Linux provides the capability for a running process to be interrupted
and its context to be written to disk. Also, the process state is deterministic and defined by the state
of the program counter and the registers; therefore, the Roll-back structure pattern is suitable for
implementation at the operating system level. With the selection of this pattern protection domain
of the failure to be limited to a single process context, which implicitly defines the containment
pattern. The implementation of the recovery pattern requires a disk storage system, to which the
checkpoint, i.e., the process state captured during failure-free operation is exported. The perfor-
mance overhead of these patterns during failure-free operation and the recovery time are dependent
on bandwidth available between memory and the disk system.
The implementation of the patterns, which is illustrated in Figure 4, is implemented using
the Berkley Lab’s Checkpoint/Restart (BLCR) [25] framework. Since BLCR does not provide a
failure detection mechanism, the Monitoring pattern is implemented by a kernel-level module that
uses heartbeat monitoring to check for process liveness. BLCR provides a completely transparent
checkpoint of the process, which saves the current state of a Linux process. The framework uses
a coarse-grain locking mechanism to momentarily interrupt the execution of all the threads of the
process, giving them a global view of its current state. The entire state is saved, including the CPU
registers, the virtual memory map as well as the function call stack. From the perspective of an
application programmer, the checkpoint routine returns with a different error code, to let the caller
know if this function call returns from a successful checkpoint or from a successful restart. The
Roll-back pattern handles recovery after the detection of a process failure by restoring the context
file set from the stable storage, and recreating the process on the same hardware, with the same
software environment. BLCR also provides an API for applications programmers to manage pattern
behavior through hooks that allow the application to block off code sections where checkpoints are
not permitted. These hooks also give applications a chance to respond to checkpoint/requests and
take appropriate action, which provides an application programmer with explicit control over the
pattern’s activation and response interfaces.
Figure 5. Case Study: Proactive Process Migration
6.2. Proactive Process Migration for Failure Avoidance
In HPC environments, various fault indicators indicate the imminence of error or failure events.
The goal of this case study is to design and implement a proactive resilience solution using the
structured design pattern-based approach. In contrast to a reactive solution that seeks to recover
from an error or a failure event after the fact, a proactive solution identifies faults in a system and
seeks to remedy the anomaly or defect to prevent their activation to result in errors or failures. This
analysis of this solution is intended to identify the patterns that must instantiated for a proactive
design approach, and to articulate the protection domain of the solution.
The key to designing a proactive strategy is the identification of fault indicators that can
sufficiently predict the activation of an error or failure. The fault model for this case study is a
defect in the system that has the potential to result in an error or failure. We consider faults
that are known to cause errors, which result in application crashes. Using design patterns, we seek
to develop a software-based solution that can preemptively migrate parts of an application away
from system resources that are about to fail. In a HPC system, the failure of a compute node
causes termination of the application processes running on that node. Since the presence of a fault
does not impact the correctness of an application program until it activates, the solution supports
proactive failure avoidance from the application’s perspective. We select the protection domain by
fusing the Persistent and Dynamic and Environment state patterns. Much like the C/R solution,
the protection domain covered by these patterns includes the complete POSIX process state in a
Linux environment. The ultimate objective of the solution is to preemptively migrate the application
processes from compute nodes where a failure is likely to cause them to crash to another node in
the system.
To anticipate the occurrence of a failure, the solution must observe critical indicators that
will predict the likelihood of a failure. We apply the Fault Treatment strategy pattern, which
is instantiated as a Fault Diagnosis pattern in every node of the HPC system. This pattern
is instantiated as a Prediction structural pattern, which enables estimating the possibility of
an imminent error or failure event. Its activation interface reads health monitoring data for the
various components in each compute node and its response interface signals the possibility of a
node failure. The prediction pattern creates a control feedback-loop such that a mitigation pattern
can take preventive action to avoid failure of the processes running on the node. Since the solution
addresses faults in the computes nodes, it requires the instantiation of another Fault Treatment
pattern for mitigation rather than a Recovery strategy pattern. For this solution, we assume that
the number of nodes allocated for an application run are determined during startup and are fixed for
the lifetime of the application run. If the application uses all nodes in the allocation at initialization
and leaves no spare nodes, the inclusion of a Compensation strategy pattern is not a suitable
alternative. The Reconfiguration architectural pattern is applied, which is instantiated in the
form of a Restructure structural pattern that isolates a failing node and migrates the application
processes to an alternative compute node in the system. The containment is implemented by a
kernel level module provides containment for the fault by identifying the process that is executing
on the node which the Prediction pattern has assessed vulnerable due to a specific set of changes
in operating conditions of the node.
The overall structure of the pattern-based design is illustrated in Figure 5. The implementation
of the Prediction pattern is realized as a per-node health monitoring mechanism that uses various
platform-level indicators in the system. It uses platform data available through the Intelligent Plat-
form Management Interface (IPMI) interface, which relies on the baseboard management controller
(BMC) to collect sensors readings for health monitoring, including the data on temperature, fan
speed, and voltage. The response interface of the pattern notifies the scheduler when the sensors
indicate deterioration of a node’s health. Since the behavior of the Recovery strategy pattern used
by this solution entails performing a live migration of a POSIX process in the context of the MPI
execution environment, the implementation of the Restructure pattern is realized within the sys-
tem’s job scheduler. The pattern identifies healthy nodes in the system as potential destinations for
the process migration. Once a destination node has been identified, the pattern initiates the migra-
tion of the process from source to destination node. It is imperative the entire context of a process
be migrated when the presence of a fault is inferred on a compute node. Therefore, the migration
entails transfer of the process image, which occurs by a page-by-page copy of the address space.
The implementation then synchronizes all the MPI processes to a consistent state, after which the
in-flight data in the MPI communication channels is drained. Once all the MPI processes reach a
consistent global state, the remaining dirty pages, which includes the registers, signal information,
pid, files, etc. to the destination node. Once the mapping of the processes to nodes in the system
has been restructured, the communication channels and the previously saved in-flight messages are
restored. The migrated processes resume execution on the destination node. The implementation
of the patterns in this solution ensure the transparency of the proactive migration to the HPC
application.
6.3. Cross-layer Hardware/Software Solution for Soft Error Resilience
In this case study, we use design patterns as building blocks to explore novel resilience solutions
that leverage capabilities from various layers of the system stack. By navigating the design spaces
of the resilience design pattern framework, we can evaluate the effectiveness of instantiating a de-
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tection, containment or mitigation pattern at a specific level in the system stack and systematically
construct a cross-layer resilience solution that connects patterns from multiple layers. The struc-
tured approach supported by the framework also enables refining the cross-layered solution. The
aim of this case study is to develop a solution that provides soft error detection and correction for
HPC application data structures. The fault model that we consider is transient errors in memory
structures that cause multiple bit flips in the application’s data or control variables, which may
result in outcomes ranging from incorrect results to fatal program crashes.
The DRAM memory chips used in HPC systems use error correcting codes (ECC) to detect
and correct bit flip errors. Similarly, algorithm-based fault tolerance techniques are available that
maintain checksums for data structures to detect and correct data value errors at the application
level. However, the lack of formal methods to combine these solutions often precludes cross-layer
hardware-software designs that cooperative protect the application data. Our proposed solution
is designed to support transient error resilience for a scientific application that uses an iterative
linear solver method. In general, these methods solve a system of linear equations represented as
A.x = B, where x is the solution vector, A is the operand matrix and b is a known vector. The
iterative algorithm begins with an initial approximation of the solution x, and refines this solution
until the residual norm is below a certain error bound. Therefore, the matrix A and vector b are
scoped within Static state patterns, the solution vector x in a Dynamic state pattern, and the
remaining variable state is contained within an Environment pattern. While the solution vector is
often tolerant to perturbations due to the iterative nature of the algorithm, any transient errors
within the scope of the two Static state patterns affects the correctness of the solver. Therefore,
we define the protection domain of our cross-layer solution to include only these static patterns.
For achieving error detection and correction in digital data, the general approach is to add
redundant information to discover errors and reconstruct the original data. This approach fits
the Compensation strategy pattern, which may be instantiated in the form of a Forward Error
Correction pattern. For the detection of the transient errors, we assume that this pattern is
implemented in the form of ECC in the DRAM modules, which supports single-bit error correction
and double-bit error detection. Therefore, the instantiation of this structural pattern handles both
detection and mitigation for single-bit errors. Double-bit errors result in an ECC violation on the
memory line, which is asynchronously communicated by the Forward Error Correction pattern
to the operating system via its response interface by raising a machine check exception. For the
containment of the double-bit error, we deploy a Fault Treatment pattern in the operating system,
since the OS views the double-bit corruption as a fault. Since the pattern must discover whether the
double-bit corruption maps to the protection domain specified by the state patterns, it is instantiated
as a Fault Diagnosis pattern, specifically as a Monitoring structural pattern. For recovery of
variable state scoped by the Static state pattern, the solution instantiates the Compensation
strategy pattern. It uses the Redundancy architecture pattern and structures the solution based on
the Forward Error Correction pattern.
The instantiation of the patterns across the system stack is illustrated in Figure 6. The
Monitoring pattern for containment is implemented as a kernel-level module that maps the physi-
cal address to the virtual address space to discover whether the fault may be contained within the
Static state pattern. The pattern’s response interface treats the presence of the fault in the state
pattern as an application error and notifies the numerical library. When the error is outside the
scope of the Static state pattern, the response interfaces indicates to the kernel module that the
error is unrecoverable, which results in the OS killing the application. Besides the Forward Error
Correction pattern in ECC for single-bit error recovery, another instance of this pattern type is
implemented in the numerical library to handle double-bit errors. The implementation maintains
a set of checksums for the matrix A and vector b. The checksums enable the identification of the
element of the matrix affected by the error, and substitution of that element with a correct value
using the remaining uncorrupted elements in the row/column and the checksum values. The instan-
tiation of the Forward Error Correction pattern at the application library level provides context
about the significance of the error to the overall application, and is able to employ an algorithm-
specific fault tolerance detection and correction method, which is more cost effective for double-bit
error mitigation than system-level bulk reliability provided by hardware-level solution such as an
enhanced ECC that supports double-bit correction. Therefore, the cooperation between patterns
across system layers supports a flexible memory protection mechanism to single and double-bit
memory errors, which allows the application to resume operation towards completion rather than
experience a fatal crash with higher performance and energy efficiency.
7. Related Work
The original concept of design patterns was developed in the context of civil architecture and
engineering problems where patterns were defined with the goal of identifying and cataloging solu-
tions to recurrent problems and solutions in the building and planning of neighborhoods, towns and
cities, as well as in the construction of individual rooms and buildings [4]. In the domain of software
engineering, patterns were introduced in an effort to bring discipline to the art of programming and
create reusable designs. The intent of software design patterns isn’t to provide a finished design
that may be transformed directly into code; rather, these patterns are used to systematize the soft-
ware development process by using proven paradigms and methodologies in software engineering
practice [12]. With the use of design patterns, there is sufficient flexibility for software developers
to adapt their implementation to accommodate any constraints, or issues that may be unique to
specific programming paradigms, or the target platform for the software. Related to software de-
sign patterns, the concept of algorithmic skeletons was introduced [16] and further refined [17]. In
the context of object-oriented (OO) programming, design patterns provide a catalog of methods
for defining class interfaces and inheritance hierarchies, and establish key relationships among the
classes [34]. In many OO systems, reusable patterns of class relationships and interactions between
objects are used to create flexible, elegant, and ultimately reusable software design. Pattern systems
have also been developed for cataloging concurrent and networked object-oriented environments [54],
resource management [41], and distributed systems [11].
In the pursuit of quality and scalable parallel software, patterns for programming paradigms
were developed [45] as well as a pattern language, called Our Pattern Language (OPL) [40]. These
describe the computation and communication patterns in various parallel algorithms and therefore
useful for designing and implementing scalable parallel applications. For engineering parallel applica-
tions for shared-memory many-core processors, parallel programming patterns simplify the process
of expressing parallelism using a number of programming interfaces such as OpenMP, OpenCL,
Cilk Plus, ArBB, Thread Building Blocks (TBB) [46]. Patterns also support the implementation of
parallel algorithms that automatically avoid unsafe race conditions and deadlocks [47].
Design patterns have been discovered in a variety of other domains and used to codify the
best-known solutions, which include patterns for natural language processing [57], user interface
design [8], web design [26], visualization [36], and software security [23]. Patterns have also been
defined for enterprise applications that involve data processing in support or automation of business
processes [32] in order to bring structure to the construction of enterprise application architectures.
In each of these domains of design, the patterns capture the essence of solutions in a succinct form
such that they may be easily applied to other contexts.
Previous efforts to develop design patterns for fault tolerance have defined a number of patterns
for error detection, recovery and mitigation. These patterns are developed based on well-known fault
tolerance solutions that are used in mission-critical systems such as telecommunication systems and
space programs [35], distributed systems [52] and enterprise data processing systems [33]. The fault
tolerant version of the Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) [50] applies patterns
in the design of the middleware to improve the performance of a range of fault tolerance strategies
that provide applications with capabilities for rapid recovery from service failures, including request-
retry, redirection, active and passive replication. While the capabilities of some of the patterns in
these domains overlap with the resilience patterns described in this document, they solve problems
that are significantly different from those encountered in HPC environments in terms of the system
architectures, the software stack, and the nature of the applications. The patterns in this document
specifically address the challenges for maintaining resilient operation for HPC systems and their
applications.
8. Summary
In this paper, we introduce the concept of resilience design patterns, which support a system-
atic approach to designing and implementing resilience solutions. The structured approach to the
design of HPC resilience solutions is useful to reduce the complexity of the design process, and is
particularly relevant for the future generations of extreme-scale parallel systems and their applica-
tions. The resilience design patterns are based on well-known and well-understood solutions that
have been applied in HPC systems and provide solutions to specific problems encountered in the
management of resilience. The patterns presented in this document support detection, containment,
masking and recovery capabilities. The resilience patterns may be used by designers as reusable tem-
plates when building and refining new resilience solutions and for reengineering existing solutions
for future generations of HPC systems. The paper also presents a classification scheme that orga-
nizes the resilience patterns in a layered hierarchy in order to expose the relationships between the
various patterns in the catalog and their capabilities. The hierarchical organization of the patterns
enables system hardware and software architects to approach the solution at an abstract level, while
individual component designers and software developers may restrict their work to the level that
directly impacts their portion of the solution. We have also developed a design framework to simplify
the composition of design patterns into complete resilience solutions. The framework is useful for
navigating the various design challenges and constraints encountered by designers and enables the
creation of flexible and portable resilience solutions. The resilience patterns and the pattern-oriented
framework also facilitates the exploration of alternative solutions, the refinement and optimization
of solutions, and the investigation of the effectiveness and efficiency of solutions. This structured
approach aims to address the resilience challenge for extreme-scale HPC systems through a system-
atic design of solutions with an emphasis on optimizing the trade-off, at design time or runtime,
between the key system design factors: performance, resilience, and power consumption.
This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Science,
Office of Advanced Scientific Computing Research, program manager Lucy Nowell, under contract
number DE-AC05-00OR22725.
References
1. Nagios monitoring system (1999), https://www.nagios.org/
2. Lustre file system, high-performance storage architecture and scalable cluster file system, white
paper. Tech. rep., Sun Microsystems, Inc. (December 2007)
3. Agelastos, A., Allan, B., Brandt, J., Cassella, P., Enos, J., Fullop, J., Gentile, A., Monk, S.,
Naksinehaboon, N., Ogden, J., Rajan, M., Showerman, M., Stevenson, J., Taerat, N., Tucker,
T.: Lightweight distributed metric service: A scalable infrastructure for continuous monitoring
of large scale computing systems and applications. In: Proceedings of IEEE/ACM International
Conference for High Performance Storage, Networking, and Analysis (SC14). IEEE/ACM (2014)
4. Alexander, C., Ishikawa, S., Silverstein, M.: A Pattern Language: Towns, Buildings, Construc-
tion. Oxford University Press, New York (August 1977)
5. Avizˇienis, A.: Toward systematic design of fault-tolerant systems. Computer 30(4), 51–58 (April
1997)
6. Batchu, R., Dandass, Y.S., Skjellum, A., Beddhu, M.: Mpi/ft: A model-based approach to low-
overhead fault tolerant message-passing middleware. Cluster Computing 7(4), 303–315 (2004)
7. Bland, W., Bouteiller, A., Herault, T., Bosilca, G., Dongarra, J.: Post-failure recovery of mpi
communication capability: Design and rationale. International Journal of High Performance
Computing Applications 27(3), 244–254 (2013)
8. Borchers, J.: A Pattern Approach to Interaction Design. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York,
NY, USA (2001)
9. Borkar, S.: Designing reliable systems from unreliable components: the challenges of transistor
variability and degradation. IEEE Micro 25(6), 10–16 (November 2005)
10. Bouteiller, A., Bosilca, G., Dongarra, J.: Redesigning the message logging model for high per-
formance. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience 22(16), 2196–2211 (2010),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/cpe.1589
11. Buschmann, F., Henney, K., Schmidt, D.C.: Pattern-Oriented Software Architecture - Volume
4: A Pattern Language for Distributed Computing. Wiley Publishing (2007)
12. Buschmann, F., Meunier, R., Rohnert, H., Sommerlad, P., Stal, M.: Pattern-Oriented Software
Architecture - Volume 1: A System of Patterns. Wiley Publishing (1996)
13. Chien, A., Balaji, P., Dun, N., Fang, A., Fujita, H., Iskra, K., Rubenstein, Z., Zheng, Z.,
Hammond, J., Laguna, I., Richards, D., Dubey, A., van Straalen, B., Hoemmen, M., Heroux,
M., Teranishi, K., Siegel, A.: Exploring versioned distributed arrays for resilience in scientific
applications: global view resilience. The International Journal of High Performance Computing
Applications (2016)
14. Chung, J., Lee, I., Sullivan, M., Ryoo, J.H., Kim, D.W., Yoon, D.H., Kaplan, L., Erez, M.:
Containment domains: a scalable, efficient, and flexible resilience scheme for exascale systems.
In: Proceedings of the International Conference on High Performance Computing, Networking,
Storage and Analysis. pp. 58:1–58:11 (2012)
15. Clustering, P.H.A.: Pvfs2 development team (June 2004), www.pvfs.org/cvs/
pvfs-2-8-branch-docs/doc/pvfs2/pvfs2-ha-heartbeat-v2.php
16. Cole, M.: Algorithmic Skeletons: Structured Management of Parallel Computation. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA, USA (1991)
17. Cole, M.: Bringing skeletons out of the closet: A pragmatic manifesto for skeletal parallel
programming. Parallel Computing 30(3), 389–406 (Mar 2004)
18. Cray Inc.: Cray xe6 computing platform (2010), http://www.cray.com/sites/default/
files/resources/CrayXE6Brochure.pdf
19. Cray Inc.: Cray xc40 computing platform (2014), http://www.cray.com/Assets/PDF/
products/xc/CrayXC40Brochure.pdf
20. van Dam, H.J.J., Vishnu, A., de Jong, W.A.: A case for soft error detection and correction in
computational chemistry. Journal of Chemical Theory and Computation 9(9), 3995–4005 (2013)
21. Dell, I.H.P.N.: Intelligent platform management interface (ipmi), v2.0 specification (2015),
http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/servers/ipmi/ipmi-home.html
22. Dongarra, J., Beckman, P., Moore, T., et al.: The International Exascale Software Project
Roadmap. International Journal on High Performance Computing Applications pp. 3–60 (Febru-
ary 2011)
23. Dougherty, C., Sayre, K., Seacord, R., Svoboda, D., Togashi, K.: Secure design patterns.
Tech. Rep. CMU/SEI-2009-TR-010, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon Univer-
sity, Pittsburgh, PA (2009)
24. Dreslinski, R.G., Wieckowski, M., Blaauw, D., Sylvester, D., Mudge, T.: Near-threshold com-
puting: Reclaiming moore’s law through energy efficient integrated circuits. Proceedings of the
IEEE 98(2), 253–266 (February 2010)
25. Duell, J., Hargrove, P., Roman, E.: The design and implementation of berkeley lab’s linux
checkpoint/restart. Tech. rep., Lawrence Berkeley National Lab (LBNL) (December 2002)
26. Duyne, D.K.V., Landay, J., Hong, J.I.: The Design of Sites: Patterns, Principles, and Processes
for Crafting a Customer-Centered Web Experience. Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co.,
Inc., Boston, MA, USA (2002)
27. Elnozahy, E.N.M., Alvisi, L., Wang, Y.M., Johnson, D.B.: A survey of rollback-recovery pro-
tocols in message-passing systems. ACM Computing Surveys 34(3), 375–408 (Sep 2002)
28. Engelmann, C., Bo¨hm, S.: Redundant execution of HPC applications with MR-MPI. In: Pro-
ceedings of the IASTED International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Computing and
Networks (PDCN). pp. 31–38 (February 2011)
29. Ferreira, K., Riesen, R., Oldfield, R., Stearley, J., Laros, J., Pedretti, K., Brightwell, R.: rmpi:
increasing fault resiliency in a message-passing environment. Tech. rep., Sandia National Lab-
oratories, Technical Report SAND2011-2488 (2011)
30. Fiala, D., Mueller, F., Engelmann, C., Riesen, R., Ferreira, K., Brightwell, R.: Detection and
correction of silent data corruption for large-scale high-performance computing. In: Proceedings
of the International Conference on High Performance Computing, Networking, Storage and
Analysis. pp. 78:1–78:12. SC ’12 (2012)
31. Fiala, D., Mueller, F., Ferreira, K., Engelmann, C.: Mini-ckpts: Surviving os failures in per-
sistent memory. In: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Supercomputing. pp.
7:1–7:14. ICS ’16 (2016)
32. Fowler, M.: Patterns of Enterprise Application Architecture. Addison-Wesley Longman Pub-
lishing Co., Inc., Boston, MA, USA (2002)
33. Friedrichsen, U.: No crash allowed - patterns for fault tolerance. In: The Conference for Java
and Software Innovation (October 2012)
34. Gamma, E., Helm, R., Johnson, R., Vlissides, J.: Design Patterns: Elements of Reusable
Object-oriented Software. Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., Inc., Boston, MA, USA
(1995)
35. Hanmer, R.: Patterns for Fault Tolerant Software. Wiley Publishing (2007)
36. Heer, J., Agrawala, M.: Software design patterns for information visualization. IEEE Transac-
tions on Visualization and Computer Graphics 12(5), 853–860 (Sep 2006)
37. Huang, K.H., Abraham, J.A.: Algorithm-based fault tolerance for matrix operations. IEEE
Transactions on Computers C-33(6), 518–528 (June 1984)
38. Hukerikar, S., Engelmann, C.: Resilience design patterns: A structured approach to resilience
at extreme scale (version 1.1). Tech. Rep. ORNL/TM-2016/767, Oak Ridge National Lab-
oratory, Oak Ridge, TN, USA (December 2016), http://www.christian-engelmann.info/
publications/hukerikar16rdp-11.pdf
39. Hursey, J., Mattox, T.I., Lumsdaine, A.: Interconnect agnostic checkpoint/restart in open mpi.
In: HPDC ’09: Proceedings of the 18th ACM international symposium on High Performance
Distributed Computing. pp. 49–58. ACM, New York, NY, USA (2009)
40. Keutzer, K., Mattson, T.: Our pattern language (opl): A design pattern language for engineer-
ing (parallel) software. In: ParaPLoP Workshop on Parallel Programming Patterns (2009)
41. Kircher, M., Jain, P.: Pattern-Oriented Software Architecture, Volume 3: Patterns for Resource
Management. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, NY, USA (2004)
42. Koren, I., Su, S.Y.H.: Reliability analysis of n-modular redundancy systems with intermittent
and permanent faults. IEEE Transactions on Computers 28(7), 514–520 (July 1979)
43. de Kruijf, M., Nomura, S., Sankaralingam, K.: Relax: an architectural framework for software
recovery of hardware faults. In: Proceedings of the 37th annual international symposium on
Computer architecture. pp. 497–508. ISCA ’10 (2010)
44. Massie, M.L., Chun, B.N., Culler, D.E.: The ganglia distributed monitoring system: design,
implementation, and experience. Parallel Computing 30(7), 817 – 840 (2004)
45. Mattson, T., Sanders, B., Massingill, B.: Patterns for Parallel Programming. Addison-Wesley
Professional, first edn. (2004)
46. McCool, M., Reinders, J., Robison, A.: Structured Parallel Programming: Patterns for Efficient
Computation. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., San Francisco, CA, USA, 1st edn. (2012)
47. McCool, M.D.: Structured parallel programming with deterministic patterns. In: Proceedings
of the 2Nd USENIX Conference on Hot Topics in Parallelism. pp. 5–5. HotPar’10, USENIX
Association, Berkeley, CA, USA (2010)
48. Mohror, K., Moody, A., Bronevetsky, G., de Supinski, B.R.: Detailed modeling and evaluation
of a scalable multilevel checkpointing system. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed
Systems 99, 1 (2013)
49. Moon, T.K.: Error correction coding: Mathematical methods and algorithms (2005)
50. Natarajan, B., Gokhale, A., Yajnik, S., Schmidt, D.C.: Doors: towards high-performance fault
tolerant corba. In: Proceedings of the International Symposium on Distributed Objects and
Applications. pp. 39–48 (2000)
51. Sahoo, R.K., Oliner, A.J., Rish, I., Gupta, M., Moreira, J.E., Ma, S., Vilalta, R., Sivasubrama-
niam, A.: Critical event prediction for proactive management in large-scale computer clusters.
In: Proceedings of the Ninth ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery
and Data Mining. pp. 426–435. KDD ’03, ACM, New York, NY, USA (2003)
52. Saridakis, T.: A system of patterns for fault tolerance. In: Proceedings of 2002 European
Conference on Pattern Languages of Programs (EuroPLoP) (2002)
53. SchedMD: Slurm workload manager (2003), https://slurm.schedmd.com/
54. Schmidt, D.C., Stal, M., Rohnert, H., Buschmann, F.: Pattern-Oriented Software Architecture:
Patterns for Concurrent and Networked Objects. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, NY,
USA, 2nd edn. (2000)
55. Shalf, J., Quinlan, D., Janssen, C.: Rethinking hardware-software codesign for exascale systems.
Computer 44(11), 22–30 (November 2011)
56. Stellner, G.: Cocheck: checkpointing and process migration for mpi. In: Proceedings of Inter-
national Conference on Parallel Processing. pp. 526–531 (Apr 1996)
57. Talton, J., Yang, L., Kumar, R., Lim, M., Goodman, N., Meˇch, R.: Learning design patterns
with bayesian grammar induction. In: Proceedings of the 25th Annual ACM Symposium on
User Interface Software and Technology. pp. 63–74. UIST ’12, ACM, New York, NY, USA (2012)
